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Walter J. Ong’s massively researched 1954 Harvard University doctoral dissertation was 
published, slightly revised, by Harvard University Press in two volumes in 1958: (1) Ramus, 
Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason and (2) 
Ramus and Talon Inventory. Peter Ramus (1515-1572) was a French logician and educational 
reformer and Protestant martyr. At Harvard College, which was founded in 1636, Ramist logic 
dominated the arts course of study, as it dominated the arts course of study at Cambridge 
University and elsewhere. 
 
Basically, Ong’s second volume, Ramus and Talon Inventory, is an annotated bibliography of the 
more than 750 printed volumes by Ramus and his followers and critics that Ong had tracked 
down in more than 100 different libraries -- almost all of them in Latin. 
 
For centuries after Latin ceased being a living language, or mother tongue, it continued to be a 
widely used lingua franca in Western culture, a second language, a father tongue, so to speak. 
Concerning the tradition of Literature in Latin, Ong liked to cite E. R. Curtius’ book European 
Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, translated from the German by Willard R. Trask (1953). 
 
But the status of Latin as a lingua franca set in motion the campaign for vernacular languages. 
Before the Gutenberg printing press emerged in the 1450s, Dante’s Divine Comedy and 
Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales were early entries in the campaign for vernacular literatures. After 
the Gutenberg printing press emerged, in the English-speaking world, the campaign for the 
vernacular included Shakespeare and the 1611 King James Bible. Of course the campaign for the 
vernaculars won out. However, in the Roman Catholic Church, Latin continued as the church’s 
official lingua franca until the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) elected to endorse the use of 
vernacular languages. 
 
In Ong’s 1958 book Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, Ong discusses the campaign 
for vernacular languages, instead of Latin as the lingua franca (pages 10-16, 305). In Ong’s 1982 
book Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word, he discusses mother tongues versus 
learned languages such a Latin as a lingua franca (pages 112-116, 130). 
 
In Virginia Woolf’s last essays, “Anon” and “The Reader,” she creatively begins to construct a 
narrative history of the unfolding development of vernacular English, starting with anonymous 
works. See my 2015 essay “Virginia Woolf’s Last Essays and Walter J. Ong’s Thought” at the 
UMD’s d-Commons: https://d-commons.d.umn.edu:8443/handle/10792/2547. 
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The year after Ong died in 2003 at the age of 90, the University of Chicago Press reissued his 
landmark 1958 book Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to 
the Art of Reason in a paperback edition with a new foreword by Adrian Johns. 
 
For Ong, the art of reason is exemplified in Descartes (pages 7, 115, 121, 125, 198, 229, 230, 
251, 307) and Kant (pages 54, 121, 315). But Ong centers his attention on their ancient, 
medieval, and early modern (also known as Renaissance) predecessors. Ong’s 1958 book still 
richly repays careful study. 
 
In it Ong works with the aural-visual contrast that he acknowledges he borrowed from THE 
French philosopher Louis Lavelle (1883-1951), most notably from his book La parole et 
l’ecriture, 2nd ed. (1942), which has never been translated into English. The aural-visual contrast 
is also known as the sound-sight contrast. 
 
For Ong, words are cries -- basically sound. 
 
But written words involve sight – both to write them and to see them. 
 
In addition, written words are written in space. 
 
For Ong, the spatialization of thought expressed implicitly in written words in space on 
parchment or another substance, and the quantification of thought expressed in certain words in 
logic combine to make a heady brew, especially in print culture in Western culture. 
 
For centuries in the history of formal logic, the quantification of thought in medieval logic was 
expressed in words. As Ong explains, certain genuine developments in medieval logic were 
anonymously incorporated into the Aristotelian tradition of logic. Eventually however, as Ong 
explains, the quantification of thought became expressed in symbols – in modern symbolic logic. 
 
In Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, Ong discusses spatialization in connection with 
the aural-to-visual shift on pages 92-93, 104-112, 128, 151-156, 244-245, 273, 277-279, 284-
292, 307-314, and quantification on pages 53-91, 184, 262, 263. 
 
After Ong’s 1958 book about Peter Ramus and Ramism was published, Ong reflected further on 
his research and then wrote the following statement regarding the quantification of thought in 
medieval logic: 
 
“In this historical perspective, medieval scholastic logic appears as a kind of premathemics, a 
subtle and unwitting preparation for the large-scale operations in quantitative modes of thinking 
which will characterize the modern world. In assessing the meaning of [medieval] scholasticism, 
one must keep in mind an important and astounding fact: in the whole history of the human 
mind, mathematics and mathematical physics come into their own, in a way which has changed 
the face of the earth and promises or threatens to change it even more, at only one place and 
time, that is, in Western Europe immediately after the [medieval] scholastic experience [in short, 
in print culture]. Elsewhere, no matter how advanced the culture on other scores, and even along 
mathematical lines, as in the case of the Babylonian, nothing like a real mathematical 
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transformation of thinking takes place – not among the ancient Egyptians or Assyrians or Greeks 
or Romans, not among the peoples of India nor the Chinese nor the Japanese, not among the 
Aztecs or Mayas, not in Islam despite the promising beginnings there, any more than among the 
Tartars or the Avars or the Turks. These people can all now share the common scientific 
knowledge, but the scientific tradition itself which they share is not a merging of various parallel 
discoveries made by their various civilizations. It represents a new state of mind. However great 
contributions other civilizations may hereafter make to the tradition, our scientific world traces 
its origins back always to seventeenth and sixteenth century Europe [in short, to Copernicus and 
Galileo], to the place where for some three centuries and more the [medieval] arts course taught 
in universities and parauniversity schools had pounded into the heads of youth a study program 
consisting almost exclusively of a highly quantified logic and a companion physics, both taught 
on a scale and with an enthusiasm never approximated or even dreamt of in ancient academies” 
(quoted from Ong’s collection of his essays titled The Barbarian Within: And Other Fugitive 
Essays and Studies [1962, page 72]; boldface emphasis here added by me). 
 
The key sentence in the above quotation: “It [the real mathematical transformation of thinking] 
represents a new state of mind” – the state of mind advanced by print culture that emerged in 
Western culture after the Gutenberg printing press emerged in the 1450s. As Ong shows, this 
state of mind was present in medieval culture and contributed to significant developments in the 
Aristotelian tradition of logic, developments that went significantly beyond Aristotle’s own 
contribution to logic – developments that moved toward modern symbolic logic, but 
developments in which words were used, not symbols. As I say, this new state of mind was 
advanced by print culture in Western culture, in which unprecedented numbers of people were 
educated enough that they learned to read and write. 
 
But here we should note a difference between ancient and medieval culture in Western culture, 
on the one hand, and, on the other, print culture in Western culture. In ancient and medieval 
culture in Western culture, this new state of mind co-existed in certain educated people in the 
prestige culture alongside the current-traditional culture of ordinary people. Woolf’s essay 
“Anon” about the medieval vernacular English culture is about the current-traditional culture of 
ordinary people in medieval England. 
 
But in print culture in Western culture, the educated people in the prestige culture extended the 
values and orientation of this new state of mind to unprecedented scope, largely because 
unprecedented numbers of ordinary people had learned how to read and write. 
 
To be sure, people who did not known how to read and write continued to exist in Western 
culture. But they tended to be excluded from the ascendant prestige culture, in which this new 
state of mind was in the ascendency. 
 
According to Ong, this new state of mind was advanced by print culture in Western culture. It 
contributed to the development of modern science, modern capitalism, modern democracy as 
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exemplified in our American experiment in democracy, the Industrial Revolution, and the 
Romantic Movement in literature and philosophy and the arts – in short, modernity. 
 
In other words, Ong sees Western liberalism (economic and political) and individualism, and 
much else as fueled by the infrastructures involved in print culture in Western culture, as he has 
detailed those infrastructures in Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue and elsewhere. 
 
To this day, Ong’s perceptive account of the philosophical infrastructures involved in Western 
cultural history is a radical one. 
 
For a far more superficial and conventional account of Western cultural history, see the Canadian 
philosophy professor Charles Taylor’s book A Secular Age (2007). Taylor spoke at the Ong 
Conference at Saint Louis University in the spring of 2005 and claimed to have read Ong’s 
Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue. But Taylor did not grasp the import of Ong’s 
thought in that book. 
 
Ironically enough, before Ong proceeded to Harvard for his doctoral studies in English, he had 
been educated in American Catholic educational institutions. At the time, college-educated 
American Catholics, like their college-educated co-religionists around the world, were 
indoctrinated by the Roman Catholic Church to be against modernity and its supposed 
concomitant secularism. This attitude is aptly captured in the title of Philip Gleason’s book 
Contending with Modernity: [American] Catholic Higher Education in the Twentieth Century 
(1995). No doubt the spirit of contending with modernity was present in Ong’s education. 
However, from about the early 1950s onward, there is no evidence in his mature work that he 
continued to see himself as contending with modernity. In his mature work, he is not contending 
with modernity. 
 
On the one hand, we may wonder why the Roman Catholic Church was so energetically 
contending with modernity and its supposed concomitant secularism. 
 
On the other hand, we may wonder what happened to Ong that he stopped contending with 
modernity. He stopped contending with modernity before the Second Vatican Council officially 
changed certain church teachings. It appears that Ong abandoned his church’s spirit of 
contending with modernity as a result of his new understanding of Western cultural history, 
inspired primarily by Lavelle’s work with the aural-visual opposition. 
 
Ong’s most widely known and most widely translated book Orality and Literacy: The 
Technologizing of the Word (1982), published in Methuen’s New Accents series in literary 
studies, contains not only a chapter titled “Writing restructures consciousness” (pages 78-116) 
but also a chapter titled “Print, space and closure” (pages 117-138). The latter chapter includes a 
subsection titled “More diffuse effects” (pages 130-132). In that subsection, Ong claims that 
print “encouraged and made possible on a large scale the quantification of knowledge, both 
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through the use of mathematical analysis and through the use of diagrams and charts [involving 
spatialization of knowledge]” (page 130). 
 
Now, in his groundbreaking philosophical masterpiece Insight: A Study of Human 
Understanding (1957), the Canadian Jesuit Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984) mocks the tendency 
in Western philosophical thought to equate knowing with “taking a good look.” According to 
him, that tendency produces naïve realism. Over against and in contradistinction to naïve 
realism, Lonergan advocates critical realism. 
 
In Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, Ong makes a point comparable to Lonergan’s 
point about “taking a good look,” but also somewhat different from Lonergan’s critique, when he 
(Ong) refers to the “unwary”: 
 
“[T]he constant traffic in the visible and tangible maintained by [medieval] suppositional theory 
[in logic] reinforced the tendency of the unwary to consider objects as somehow lifted into the 
mind by conceptualization and as being equipped with their accidental modifications in a fashion 
only too crudely analogous with processes observable in the external world. . . . This tendency is 
reinforced by the notion of supposition itself when one examines the elementary metaphor it 
involves. In cicero and others, supponere meant to substitute, so that the unwary easily came to 
think of terms not as ‘signifying’ things or reality, not as affording an insight into reality, but as 
surrogates or substitutes for things. . . . This substitution view lends itself readily to visualist 
conceptualization: a term is not seen in its relation to a word, a cry, but rather one imagines the 
thing the thing as whisked away in space and a term as set in its place. The psychological 
complexities and mysteries of the actual semantic situation can never be completely reduced thus 
visually or spatially, since the situation involves an irreducible analogy with auditory activity, 
the calling of the ‘names’ of things” (pages 69-70; also see pages 107-108, 109). 
 
In Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, Ong uses various expressions to characterize the 
corpuscular view of reality (also referred to as the corpuscular epistemology and corpuscular 
psychology; pages 65-66, 72, 146, 171, 203, 210). 
 
In effect, what Ong refers to as the corpuscular view of reality is comparable to what Lonergan 
refers to as naïve realism in Insight. 
 
For an accessible philosophical explanation of why the human mind is not corpuscular, see 
Mortimer J. Adler’s perceptive book Intellect: Mind Over Matter (1990). Also see James H. 
Fetzer’s book Artificial Intelligence: Its Scope and Limits (1990). 
 
In the 1994 introduction to the second edition of his 1965 book, Belief and Unbelief: A 
Philosophy of Self-Knowledge, based on Lonergan’s philosophical masterpiece Insight, Michael 
Novak in effect critiques the world-as-view sense of life expressed in Richard Rorty’s 
philosophy: 
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“Rorty thinks that in showing that the mind is not ‘the mirror of nature’ he has disproved the 
correspondence theory of truth. What he has really shown is that the activities of the human mind 
cannot be fully expressed by metaphors based upon the operations of the eye [as Novak knows, 
both Ong and Lonergan would agree with him about this critique of Rorty]. We do not know 
simply through ‘looking at’ reality as though our minds were simply mirrors of reality. One 
needs to be very careful not to confuse the activities of the mind with the operations of any (or 
all) bodily senses [see Ong’s repeated critique of corpuscular, or bodily, epistemology]. In 
describing how our minds work, one needs to beware of being bewitched by the metaphors that 
spring from the operations of our senses. Our minds are not like our eyes; or, rather, their [our 
minds’] activities are far richer, more complex, and more subtle than those of our eyes. It is true 
that we often say, on getting the point, ‘Oh, I see!’ But putting things together and getting the 
point normally involve a lot more than ‘seeing,’ and all that we need to do to get to that point can 
scarcely be met simply by following the imperative, ‘Look’ [Or by following the biblical 
imperative, ‘Hear, O Israel!’] Even when the point, once grasped, may seem to have been (as it 
were) right in front of us all along, the reasons why it did not dawn upon us immediately may be 
many, including the fact that our imaginations were ill-arranged, so that we were expecting and 
‘looking for’ the wrong thing. To get to the point at which the evidence finally hits us, we may 
have to undergo quite a lot of dialectical argument and self-correction” (page xv; material in 
square brackets added by me). 
 
Thus far, however, Novak himself has not yet gotten to the point at which the evidence 
supporting Ong’s sweeping claim about communications media hits him. Perhaps Novak’s 
imagination is ill-arranged for the purposes of grasping Ong’s thought. 
 
It is not especially hard for someone who has read Ong, as Novak has, to paraphrase Ong’s key 
points in his or her own words. 
 
Nevertheless, it is not easy for people to grasp the import of Ong’s sweeping thought. 
 
If we were to take a hint from Novak, we might attribute the difficulty to certain people having 
ill-equipped imaginations. But this way of explaining their difficulty in grasping the import of 
Ong’s sweeping thought might prompt us to wonder what exactly is ill-equipped about their 
imaginations. For example, are their imaginations ill-equipped in the sense of being already 
equipped with something that makes it difficult for them to grasp the import of Ong’s sweeping 
thought, or are their imaginations ill-equipped in the sense of their not having something that 
they would presumably need to have in order to grasp the import of Ong’s sweeping thought? 
 
In any event, Ong’s imagination was not ill-equipped for grasping the import of Lavelle’s 
thought about the aural-visual opposition. 
 
No doubt the imagination plays a big role in how we cognitively process sensory information. 
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No doubt Ong’s and Lavelle’s and Lonergan’s claim about the uncritical visual tendency of 
Western philosophic thought is greatly strengthened by Andrea Wilson Nightingale’s book 
Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in its Cultural Context (2004). 
(However, she does not happen to advert explicitly to the relevant books by Lavelle and Ong and 
Lonergan.) 
 
But Ong also claims that after the Gutenberg printing press emerged in the 1450s, printed books 
and pamphlets somehow worked to expand the visual sense of life among ordinary educated 
people generally, not just among people who had studied Western philosophy and Christian 
theology (based on Greek philosophical thought). 
 
Ong includes a certain number of illustrations in Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue that 
are reproduced from printed books by Ramus and his followers (pages 31, 77, 78, 80, 81, 83, 84, 
86, 87, 88, 90,181, 202, 261, 296, 300, 301, 317). Regarding Figure IV titled “Logic in Space” 
(on page 80), Ong comments in his annotation about it that it expresses the common human urge 
to construct mandalas such as those mandalas studied by C. G. Jung (page xvi). 
 
No doubt Ramus and his followers delighted in constructing arrays of dichotomized 
philosophical terms in charts in their printed books. 
 
But the impulse to construct dichotomized opposites in Western cultural history pre-dates the 
emergence of the Gutenberg printing press in the 1450s, as Jung details in his book Mysterium 
Coniunctionis: An Inquiry into the Separation and Synthesis of Psychic Opposites in Alchemy, 
2nd ed., translated by R. F. C. Hull (1970; orig. German ed. in two parts, 1955 and 1956). 
 
For a discussion of Jung’s thought, see my 2015 essay “Understanding Jung’s Thought” at the 
UMD’s d-Commons: https://d-commons.d.umn.edu:8443/handle/10792/2576. 
 
James Collins (1917-1985) in philosophy at St. Louis University, where Ong taught English, 
perceptively reviewed Ong’s two 1958 books in the Jesuit-sponsored magazine America, volume 
101 (1959): pages 37-39. 
 
At an earlier time, Collins had published an article about Lavelle’s philosophy: “Louis Lavelle 
on Human Participation” in the Philosophical Review, volume 56, number 2 (March 1947): 
pages 156-183. As a result, Collins’ imagination was well arranged to enable him to grasp the 
import of Ong’s thought. 
 
However, print culture is not the end of the story, as it were. According to Ong, our 
contemporary communications media that accentuate sound had reached a certain critical mass 
by about 1960 and were deeply impacting Western cultural conditioning over against the visual 
cultural conditioning in Western culture after the Gutenberg printing press emerged in the 1450s. 
 
At a later time, in his annual review of books in philosophy in the journal Cross Currents, 
volume 18 (1968): pages 175-202, Collins briefly but incisively reviewed Ong’s book The 
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Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History (1967), the 
expanded version of Ong’s Terry Lectures at Yale’s Divinity School. 
 
Subsequently, in his annual review of books in philosophy in Cross Currents, volume 33 (1983): 
pages 34-51, Collins briefly but incisively reviewed Ong’s book Fighting for Life: Contest, 
Sexuality, and Consciousness (1981), Ong’s 1979 Messenger Lectures at Cornell University. 
 
Ong himself delivered a plenary address about certain aspects of that book at the annual meeting 
of the American Catholic Philosophical Association in 1982, which was published in the 
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, volume 56 (1982): pages 109-
124.  
 
Ong’s plenary address is reprinted in An Ong Reader: Challenges for Further Inquiry (2002, 
pages 479-495). 
 
Now, Ong expressed hope that the possibly positive influence of the cultural conditioning of the 
communications media that accentuate sound. He came to express hope as a result of working 
with the aural-visual opposition that he borrowed from Lavelle. But of course the aural-visual 
opposition is another example of a constructed dichotomy of opposites. In the subtitle of Jung’s 
book about alchemy, mentioned above, we note that he hints that the separation of psychic 
opposites oftentimes leads to a synthesis of the opposites. 
 
According to Ong’s account of our Western cultural history, there was an earlier separation of 
visually dominated culture from aurally dominated culture in ancient and medieval culture in 
Western culture, a separation that was accentuated in print culture after the Gutenberg printing 
press emerged in the 1450s in Western culture. 
 
Hopefully, the communications media that accentuate sound will condition the psyches of people 
in contemporary Western culture to move toward a synthesis in their psyches.     
 
Now, the aural sensibility dominated the psyches of our pre-historic and pre-literate human 
ancestors for centuries – long before the visual sensibility emerged in ancient Greek philosophic 
thought. But the pre-historic and pre-literate aural sensibility was effectively suppressed in the 
prestige culture in print culture after the Gutenberg printing press emerged in the 1450s in 
Western culture. 
 
For highly circumstantial account of our pre-historic and pre-literate human ancestors, see Erich 
Neumann’s books The Origins and History of Consciousness, translated by R. F. C. Hull (1954; 
orig. German ed., 1949) and The Great Mother: An Analysis of the Archetype, 2nd ed., translated 
by Ralph Manheim (1963). 
 
Now, in print culture in Western culture, the pre-historic and pre-literate aural sensibility was 
effectively suppressed in the realm of the psyche that Jung refers to as the “shadow.” 
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According to Jung, people in the second half of life need to undertake to integrate the “shadow” 
realm of their psyches with their ego-consciousness. But he makes it abundantly clear that this is 
not easy to do. 
 
No doubt the communications media that accentuate sound resonate deeply in the human psyche 
of people in Western culture, whose “shadow” carries the stored memory of the aural sensibility 
of our pre-historic and pre-literate human ancestors. 
 
After Ong delineated certain infrastructures in Western cultural history in Ramus, Method, and 
the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason (1958), he discussed 
them a bit further in his book The Barbarian Within: And Other Fugitive Essays and Studies 
(1962). 
 
Thereafter, Ong shifted his attention from print culture in Western culture to the aural sensibility 
of our pre-historic and pre-literate human ancestors inasmuch as it was possible for him to do 
this. Even so, he never stopped talking about the contemporary communications media that 
accentuate sound. 
 
However, inasmuch as it was possible for him to undertake to do this, Ong was effectively 
leaving the domain of Western philosophical thought and moving into pre-philosophical thought. 
In Plato’s dialogue the Republic and elsewhere, we learn about the opposition of philosophic 
thought to poetry, a form of pre-philosophic thought. 
 
In the book Preface to Plato (1963), a book that Ong never tired of referring to, Eric A. 
Havelock argues cogently and convincingly that the oral poetry in the Homeric epics was the 
target. In terms of the aural-visual opposition that Ong borrowed from Lavelle, the oral poetry in 
the Homeric epics represents the aural sensibility. By contrast, ancient Greek philosophic 
thought exemplified by Plato and Aristotle represents the visual sensibility, as does the entire 
subsequent Western tradition of philosophic thought. 
 
In the last half century or so during which the communications media that accentuate sound have 
reached a certain critical mass around 1960, we have seen a superficial interest in Native 
American spirituality arise in American popular culture, as Philip Jenkins shows in his book 
Dream Catchers: How Mainstream America Discovered Native Spirituality (2004). Historically, 
Native American spirituality represented the aural sensibility, not the culturally conditioned 
visual sensibility in the prestige and dominant culture in Western culture. However, even though 
Native American spirituality has caught the imagination of a certain number of Americans, it 
remains an open question as to how deeply their imaginations have processed the aural 
sensibility of Native American spirituality. 
 
But in the last half century or so in American culture, we have also seen movement conservatism 
arise as the tsunami of a backlash against the yeasty 1960s, as Jenkins shows in his book Decade 
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of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties America (2006). After Dr. 
King was assassinated in 1968, riots and violence broke out in certain American cities. In part, 
the backlash was an understandably reaction to the riots and violence. But certain conservatives 
capitalized on the understandable reaction against the riots and violence to promote movement 
conservatism. To this day, movement conservatism has not yet been counter-acted in American 
culture. 
 
No doubt the serious practice of spirituality taps into the aural sensibility to one degree or 
another, or at least aims to do so. 
 
No doubt profound mystical experiences involve the aural sensibility. 
 
No doubt a profound experience of the resurfacing aural sensibility involves the imagination – 
and the entire psyche – and a concomitant reorientation of the culturally conditioned visual 
sensibility. But the reorientation of the visual sensibility in certain persons may strike others who 
have not yet had the reorienting experience as threatening. To them, the prospect of the 
reorienting experience may seem like a breakdown, not as a breakthrough. 
 
Now, the anti-60s conservatives represent the centuries-old culturally conditioned visual 
sensibility in the prestige and dominant culture in American culture. To this day, the end of their 
anti-60s backlash is not yet in sight.  
 
No doubt the imaginations of anti-60s conservatives are ill-equipped to cope with changes 
arising from the resurfacing of the aural sensibility in the 1960s due to the influence of the 
cultural conditioning of the communications media that accentuate sound. The visual sensibility 
of their ego-consciousness is like a portable prison-cage they carry around wherever they go. 
 
In any event, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary in 2012 of Ong’s birth in 1912, Cornell 
University Press reissued the three books by Ong that were originally published by Cornell 
University Press, using print-on-demand technology: (1) Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology: 
Studies in the Interaction of Expression and Culture (1971); (2) Interfaces of the Word:  Studies 
in the Evolution of Consciousness and Culture (1977); and (3) Fighting for Life: Contest, 
Sexuality, and Consciousness (1981). 
 
In my estimate, however, Ong’s massively researched 1958 book Ramus, Method, and the Decay 
of Dialogue is of crucial importance for understanding his mature thought about our Western 
cultural history. 
 
